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Liquidity plays an important role in explaining how banks determine their allocation of
funds. This paper analyses whether this fact can explain the term structure of interest rates
and yield spreads. The paper models banks’ demand for liquidity in a manner similar to that
used to study household need for liquidity, namely, by using a cash-in-advance type model.
The paper finds that the shadow price of the cash-in-advance constraint plays an important
role in determining yield spreads. The model predicts that short-term rates respond more to
monetary policy than long-term rates, consistent with earlier empirical findings. The
empirical part of the paper shows that the expectations hypothesis might be salvaged under
the maintained hypothesis concerning the liquidity premium and default risk premium. This
paper confirms the finding that monetary contractions raise nominal interest rates.
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II. Banks’ Optimal Behaviour Subject
     to a Cash in Advance Constraint 6





       An attractive theory of the term structure of interest rates is the expectations hypothesis,
which holds that fluctuations in the slope of the yield curve reflect expected future interest
rate changes. Many empirical studies such as Shiller, Campbell and Schoenholtz (1983),
Fama (1984), Mankiw and Miron (1986), Fama and Bliss (1987), Mishkin (1988),
Hardouvelis (1988), Froot (1989), Simon (1989, 1990), Cook and Hahn (1990), Campbell
and Shiller (1991), and Roberds et al. (1996) find that the estimated coefficients in a
regression of the change in the expected future short-term interest rates on the yield spread
are significantly less than the value of unity predicted by the expectations hypothesis and
differ as the forecast horizon varies
1. Even though Fama (1984), Mishkin (1988), Hardouvelis
(1988), and Simon (1990) have found yield spreads do help to predict future rates, the
coefficient appears inconsistent with the expectations hypothesis.
              Various previous studies have focused on the possibility of a the time-varying risk
premium and concluded that a time-varying risk premium can help explain the failures of the
expectations theory. Examples include Engle, Lilien and Robins (1987), Simon (1989, 1990),
Friedman and Kuttner (1992) and Lee (1995).
       On the other hand, several studies such as Mankiw and Miron (1986), McCallum (1994),
and Rudebusch (1995) have shown that even if the expectations theory holds, supporting
empirical evidence cannot be obtained from the forecasting ability of the slope of the yield
curve due to interest rate smoothing by the Fed. Mankiw and Miron (1986) argued that the
negligible predictive power of the spread after the founding of the Fed did not reflect a
failure of the expectations theory. Instead, they suggested that the Fed ‘stabilized’ short-term
rates, such as the three-month rate, by inducing a random-walk behavior, which eliminated
any predictable variation. McCallum (1994) proposes that the empirical failure of the rational
expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates can be rationalized with the
                                                          
1 Rudebusch (1995) refers to the ‘U-shaped’ pattern of the predictability of the yield curve. Roberds
and Whiteman (1997) state the existence of a “predictability smile” in the term structure of interest
rates: spreads between long maturity rates and short rates predict subsequent movements in interest4
expectations theory by recognition of an exogenous random term premium plus the
assumption that monetary policy involves smoothing of an interest rate instrument -- the
short-term rate -- together with the responses to the prevailing level of the spread. Rudebusch
(1995) states that the Federal Reserve’s interest rate targeting behavior accompanied by the
maintained rational expectations hypothesis explains the varying predictive ability of the
yield curve.
       However, these reasons are not sufficient to address why the result of the empirical test
of the expectations hypothesis is not in accordance with the prediction of the expectations
hypothesis. Evans and Lewis (1994) point out that a time-varying risk premium alone is not
sufficient to explain the time-varying term premium in the Treasury bill. Dotsey and Otrok
(1995) say that a deeper understanding of interest rate behavior will be produced by jointly
taking into account the behavior of the monetary authority along with a more detailed
understanding of what determines term premia.
       Recently, Bansal and Coleman (1996) argue that some assets other than money play a
special role in facilitating transactions, which affects the rate of return that they offer. In their
model, they show that securities that back checkable deposits provide a transaction service
return in addition to their nominal return. Since short-term government bonds facilitate
transactions by backing checkable deposits, this results in equilibrium in a lower nominal
return for these bonds. In fact, the transaction service return of short-term bonds comes from
the liquidity of short-term bonds. Such a view implies that liquidity plays an important role in
determining the returns of various securities.
       In general, liquidity refers to the ease with which an asset can be bought or sold. Asset
purchases or sales are subject to transaction costs and the degree of liquidity of an asset
decreases as the costs incurred in buying and selling it increase. So, if liquidity is an
important factor determining the returns of financial assets among investors in financial
markets, we will also have to incorporate liquidity into the term structure of interest rates.
                                                                                                                                                                     
rates provided the long horizon is three months or less or if the long horizon is two years or more, but
not for immediate maturities.5
But how do investors consider liquidity in allocating their funds between securities of
different terms? Since commercial banks are principal investors and primary dealers in
instruments such as federal funds, commercial papers, and Eurodollar CDs, a study of
liquidity demand by commercial banks may provide the key to answering this question.
Stigum (1990) states that “in the money market, in particular, banks are players of such major
importance that any serious discussion of the various markets that comprise the money
market must be prefaced with a careful look at banking.” Cook and La Roche (1993)
emphasize that commercial banks play an important role in the money market.
       In terms of banks, liquidity means having ready cash (reserves) in all currencies to pay
the bills, to fund the drawdowns of loan commitments, to meet depositor withdrawals, to
honor cash calls on foreign exchange contracts and guarantees, and to meet reserve
requirements (Abboud (1987)). If a bank might at some point be unable to turn its assets into
ready cash, the bank faces a liquidity risk. Liquidity is a crucial fact of life for banks, and for
this reason may have an implication for the term structure of interest rates. For example,
since banks’ loans are relatively long-term assets and illiquid, they are not appropriate in
terms of bank’s liquidity management. By contrast, government short-term securities such as
Treasury bills are very liquid. Stigum (1990) emphasizes that all banks hold government
securities for liquidity and profit. .
       In addition, since banks’ liquidity can be time-varying in accordance with the policy of
the Fed, the situation of the financial markets, the individual bank’s specific demand for
reserves and so on, banks’ liquidity might play an important role in explaining time-varying
term premium. Most previous studies, however, have not focused on banks as the main
investors in financial markets and thus, banks’ liquidity.
       This paper attempts to answer the following question. Can the fact that liquidity plays an
important role in explaining how banks determine their allocation of funds explain the term
structure of interest rates?6
       The  paper  begins  by  developing  a  model  of  a  bank’s  optimal  behavior.  This  model
incorporates the cash-in-advance constraint (liquidity constraint ) of Clower (1967), Lucas
(1982), Sevensson (1985), Lucas and Stokey (1987) and Bansal and Coleman (1996) into a
model of bank decision-making similar to Cosimano (1987), Cosimano and Van Huyck
(1989), Elyasiani, Kopecky and Van Hoose (1995), and Kang (1997). In addition, this model
models a time-varying default risk premium. The paper then studies the implications resulting
from banks’ liquidity needs. The paper finds that the shadow price of the cash-in-advance
constraint has an important role in determining the term structure of interest rates. The
empirical part of the paper shows that the expectations hypothesis might be salvaged under
the maintained hypothesis concerning the liquidity premium and the default risk premium.
The paper also predicts the effect of a monetary policy shock on the short-term rate is bigger
than on the long-term rate, consistent with earlier empirical findings of Cook and Hahn
(1989). This paper also confirms the finding of Hamilton (1996, 1997a, 1997b) that the
liquidity effect is real, i.e., a monetary contraction raises short-term interest rate.
       The plan of this paper is as follows. Section II develops a model which incorporates
liquidity into banks’ optimal behavior and explains determination of the term structure of
interest rates. Section III provides a brief empirical test of the simple expectations hypothesis
and shows the empirical results for theoretical model developed in Section II. A brief
summary and concluding remark are given on Section VI.
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       This section develops a model that incorporates liquidity into banks’ optimal behavior.
The first part presents a simplified model in which bank loans are two period assets and
federal funds lent are one-period assets. The second part generalizes to the case when bank7
loans are n-period assets and federal funds are one-period assets. The key results are the same
in both cases.
,,Basic Model
       There are many banks in the banking system. Banks have an infinite-period horizon.
Each period consists of two sessions, the beginning of period t and the end of period t. We
assume that the public prefers demand deposits to cash and so all the cash is deposited in the
bank at the end of the period. The reserve supply in the banking system does not change
unless the Fed changes it. Banks face default risks on loans and this default risk increases as
the quantity of loans or the maturity of loans increases. In addition, it is assumed that there is
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where  /W  is the quantity of new two-period loans made in period t, UW
/  is the yield on two-
period loan made at time t, UW
)  is the yield on federal funds lent or borrowed at time t,  )W  is
the federal funds lent or borrowed at time t, and TW represents an unobserved shocks to
default risk of loan supply. Thed s’ are non-negative constants. The two expressions in
parentheses represent the default risk on loans each period.
       The bank chooses the level of new loans  /W  at the beginning of period t. At the end of
period t, it chooses the quantity of federal funds to lend  )W . These choices, along with some
other exogenous or predetermined factors, determine the level of reserves 5W  with which the
bank will end the period. These other factors are (1) the bank’s level of demand deposits,  'W ,
which is taken to be exogenous, with positive value for '' WW - -1 increasing the bank’s end-
of-period reserve position; (2) the repayment of the Fed funds the bank lent the previous8
period ( 1 - W ) ); and (3) the repayment of the loans the bank made 2 periods previously ( 2 - W / ).
The bank’s end-of-period reserves thus evolve according to
55 / /) '' ) WW W W W WW W =+- ++ -- -- - - 12 1 1
In addition, the bank must satisfy the reserve requirement
5' WW ³q
where q is the ratio of the required reserves.
       The state variables that are relevant for the bank’s decision about the quantity of Fed
funds to lend at the end of period t are  // / ) 5 ' WW W W W W
*,,,,, ---- 1211. Consider following the
value function formulation of the decision for the end-of-period at time t:
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where  8W() ×  denotes the lifetime value of the bank’s optimal program as of the second
session of period t whereas 9// )5 WWW WW (, ,,) -1  is the value as of the first session of period
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The left-hand side in equation (1) is the marginal benefit of lending federal funds and the
right is the marginal cost.
       In the beginning of a period t, a representative bank starts with reserve balances given by
5W-1. Given the loan rate and the federal funds rate, a representative bank must choose its
loan supply,  /W , before knowing the deposit,  W ' . We model the bank’s need for liquidity in
the same way that the cash-in-advance (hereafter CIA) literature has modeled demand for
liquidity by private households. In the conventional cash-in-advance formulation, goods must9
be purchased with cash, and a consumer can only obtain goods if he has cash on hand
sufficient to pay for them. In our model, a borrower from the bank wants cash, and the bank
can only extend a loan to such a customer if it has cash on hand equal to the amount of the
loan. In either application, the strict cash-in-advance requirement ignores such real-life
institutions as credit cards available to consumers or within-day overdraft privileges available
to banks on their accounts with the Fed. Even so, the requirement of needing actual cash on
hand for certain transactions seems to capture the key idea of what is meant by liquidity and
has proven a useful framework for thinking about liquidity demand by private households.
We propose that it may also be fruitful for seeing how the need for liquidity may make a
difference for understanding the rates of return on assets of different maturities held by
banks. Thus, we propose that a representative bank faces a CIA or liquidity constraint such as
the following:
/5 WW £ -1                                                                                                                               ( 3 )
where  5W-1 is the reserve balances transferred from the previous period to the start of period
t. The state variables for the decision at the beginning of the period t are
//)5' WWWW W ---- - 12111 ,,,,.
The value function of the beginning-of-period at time t is
1
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where hW denotes the multiplier of CIA constraint and represents the shadow price of the CIA
constraint. The left-hand side of equation (4) is the marginal benefit of increasing loans and
the right is the marginal cost.
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Equation (7) is the equilibrium condition to determine the federal funds rate at time t since at
this point, a representative bank is indifferent to choosing  )W = 0. Equation (7) means that
the current federal funds rate is the discounted expected value of the next-period shadow
price of the CIA constraint plus the shadow price of the required reserve constraint at time t
and thus, the federal funds rate reflects liquidity. In addition, we get the following result by
using the envelope condition from the value function of the beginning-of-period t,
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Substituting equation (8) into equation (4) results in
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Equation (9) can be rewritten as follows;11
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       Equation (10) means that the loan rate is the weighted average of the current federal
funds rate and future federal funds rate plus the cost resulting from default risk (or
transaction cost) on loans and the cost of loss of the liquidity benefit. The second term of the
right-hand side is the default risk premium while the third term of the right-hand side is the
liquidity premium.
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Equation (11) is an Euler equation and an optimality condition between the loan market and
the federal funds market. The left hand side of the equation (11) is the marginal benefit of
increasing loans and the right is the marginal benefit of lending federal funds. In our model, a
representative bank has two options at time t-1. One option is for the bank to hold reserves
5W-1 at the end of period t-1 in order to lend them at the beginning of period t. The other
option is that the bank rolls over the reserves as federal funds for two periods. For two cases,
the streams of bank’s return are shown in Table 1.
Table 1. The streams of bank’s returns for two options of allocating funds
time                                t-1                   t                         t+1                         t+2
Return (loan)                   0                   UW
/                       UW
/              get back the loan
Return (F. funds)           UW
)
-1                UW
)                      UW
)
+1             get back the federal funds
Equation (11) can be rewritten as follows;12
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By using equation (7), equation (12) can be rewritten as follows;
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Equation (13) implies that the loan rate is a weighted average of the previous federal funds
rate, the current federal funds rate and the future federal funds rate plus the default risk
premium and the shadow price of the required reserve constraint at time t-1. Comparing
equation (10) with equation (13) gives some intuition. Since the current shadow price of the
cash-in-advance constraint is related to the previous federal funds rate, the previous federal
funds rate impacts the loan rate - and thus - the term structure of interest rates.
              Since in practice, observed excess reserves are always greater than zero during this
sample period, we assume that the required reserve constraint is always non-binding
2. Then,
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Moreover, because the federal funds rate is never observed to be zero, from equations (2), (5)
and (7), the shadow price of the CIA constraint is always greater than zero and hence the
constraint is always binding. Therefore, equation (5) becomes
/5 WW = -1                                                                                                                             ( 15 )
Substituting equation (15) into equation (14) gives us
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Equation (16) implies that the reserve balances (i.e., banks’ liquidity) have impact not only
on two interest rates but also on the term premium and thus, monetary policy can affect the
term structure of interest rates.
       So far, we considered a representative bank’s optimal behavior given the loan rate and
federal funds rate. However, since the loan rate and the federal funds rate are determined on
the loan market and federal funds market, we need to incorporate the general equilibrium into
our model. We assume that the public’s demand for new loans is as follows;
/DE UD E WWW
/
W =- > > ,, 00                                                                                             ( 17 )
Equation (17) implies that the new total demand for loans is an inverse function of the loan
rate. The term DW  reflects the loan demand shock. The equilibrium condition for new loans is
// WW =                                                                                                                                ( 18 )
where  /W  is the new total supply of loans at time t. The total supply of loans is the sum of the
individual bank’s supply of loans at time t. Since the CIA constraint is always binding,
equation (15) becomes the new total loan supply of the banking system. Hence, equation
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Equation (19) means that the loan rate is a function of the shock to the demand for loan and
the level of reserve balances. Combining equation (16) with equation (19) and rewriting it
results in
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Equation (20) is the second-order stochastic difference equation with respect to the federal
funds rate. In order to examine the effect of the exogenous change of the state variables on
the interest rate, we need to know the process of the state variable. Suppose for example that
                                                                                                                                                                     
2 The data for the excess reserves of depository institution which are taken from Statistical Release
provided by the Federal Reserve Board of Governor show that excess reserves are always positive14
the reserve supply, the shock to loan demand, and the unobserved shock to the default risk of
the loan supply follow a random walk without drift,
55 1 WW W W =+ -1
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We also assume that the innovations, e x WWW H ,, are serially uncorrelated and mutually
independent. We conjecture the following solution function for the federal funds rate
UD 5 T W
)
WWW =+ + + aa a a 12 3 4                                                                                          ( 24 )
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Equation (25) shows that the federal funds rate depends on the shock to loan demand, the
level of reserve balances, and the unobserved shock to the default risk of loan supply. From
equations (19) and (25), we can examine the effect of the exogenous shock to the loan rate
and the federal funds rate, and thus, to the term structure of interest rates. Suppose that there
occurs a positive loan demand shock. How do the loan rate and the federal funds rate respond
to the loan demand shock? We can examine the effects by taking the differential of the loan
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Equation (26) implies that the positive loan demand shock raises the loan rate and the federal
funds rate. The response of the federal funds rate to a loan demand shock is less than that of
the loan rate to the loan demand shock. The reason is that the change of the loan rate reflects
the change of the shadow price of the CIA constraint while the change of the federal funds
rate doesn’t. In other words, since the positive loan demand shock raises the shadow price of
                                                                                                                                                                     
during the sample period of our empirical study.15
the CIA constraint, from equation (10) the increase in the loan rate is bigger than the increase
in the federal funds rate. The response of the loan rate to the positive loan demand shock
spreads over 2 returns while the response of the federal funds rate to the positive loan
demand shock spreads over 3 returns.
       To find the effect of a monetary shock to the loan rate and the federal funds rate in this
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Equation (27) means that an expansionary (contractionary) monetary shock decreases
(increases) the loan rate and the federal funds rate. We can not determine whether the
response of the federal funds rate to the monetary shock is bigger than that of the loan rate to
the monetary shock. It depends on the parameter, d1, which reflects the cost incurred from
default risk on loans. If this parameter is big enough, the response of the federal funds rate to
the monetary shock is bigger than that of the loan rate to the monetary shock. The reason is
that the change in the default risk premium is opposite to the change in loan rate. If the
change in the default risk premium is greater than the change in the shadow price of the CIA
constraint, the change in the federal funds rate is bigger than the change in the loan rate in a
no arbitrage equilibrium. For example, suppose that there occurs a contractionary monetary
shock. On the one hand, because of the increase in the shadow price of the CIA constraint
banks want to hold reserves and thus, transfer reserves from the loan market to the federal
funds market. This force prevents the federal funds rate from increasing strongly. Loan rate,
federal funds rate and the shadow price of the CIA constraint will increase. On the other
hand, from equation (16), the default risk premium will decrease. If the decrease in the
default risk premium is bigger than the increase in the shadow price of the CIA constraint,
then the response of the federal funds rate to the contractionary monetary shock will be
bigger than that of the loan rate in a no-arbitrage equilibrium.16
,, General Model
       So far, we focused on the simple case in which loan was a two-period asset and federal
funds lent a one-period asset. In this section, we will extend our model to the case in which
loans are the n-period assets and federal  funds lent one-period assets. The basic set-up is the
same. A representative bank’s profit function is as follows;
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,  is the yield on n-period loan made at time t.
       In this case, a representative bank has two options at time t-1. One option is for the bank
to hold reserves  5W-1 at the end of period t-1 in order to lend them over n period at the
beginning of period t. The other option is that the bank rolls over reserves as federal funds for
n periods. If a representative bank lends the public loans over n periods, the bank faces
default risks on loans and this default risk increases as the quantity of loans or the maturity of
loans increases. The expressions in parentheses represent the default risk on loans each
period. Let us consider more specific behavior of a representative bank for two sessions of
one period.
       At the end of period t, the bank chooses the quantity of federal funds to lend )W . These
choices, along with some other exogenous or predetermined factors, determine the level of
reserves 5W  with which the bank will end the period. These other factors are the same for (1)
and (2) in the basic model and (3) the repayment of the loans the bank made n periods
previously ( /WQ - ). The bank’s end-of-period reserves thus evolve according to;
W W W W W Q W W W ) / ' ' ) / 5 5 - - - + + + = - - - - 1 1 1
In addition, the bank must satisfy the reserve requirement
5' WW ³q17
       The state variables that are relevant for the bank’s decision about the quantity of Fed
funds to lend at the end of period t are  // / ) 5 ' WW W Q W W W , ,..., , , , -- - - 11 1 . The value function
formulation of the decision for the end-of-period at time t is as follows;
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       In the beginning of the period t, a representative bank starts with reserve balances given
by  5W-1. Given the loan rate and federal funds rate, a representative bank must choose its
loan supply,  /W , before knowing the deposit,  'W . The bank faces a CIA constraint as was the
case in the basic model. The state variables for the decision at the beginning of the period t
are  1 1 1 2 1 , , , ,..., , - - - - - - W W W Q W W W ' ) 5 / / / . The value function of the beginning of period t is as
follows;
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The left-hand side of equation (30) is the marginal benefit of increasing loans and the right is
the marginal cost. By using the envelope condition, we get the same equilibrium condition
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Substituting equation (32) into equation (30) results in
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Equation (33) can be rewritten as follows;
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       Equation (34) means that the n-period loan rate is the weighted average of the one-period
current federal funds rate and the expected future federal funds rates over n periods plus the19
cost resulting from the default risk on loans and the cost from the loss of the liquidity benefit.










( U ( U (
T ( / ( U (
h b b b
d d b b b b b b
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 0
1
, 1
1 ) )( 1 ( ) 1 (





+ + × × × + =
+ + + × × × + + - + × × × + +
              ( 35 )
Equation (35) is an Euler equation and an optimality condition between the loan market and
the federal funds market. This equation determines the term structure of the interest rates
between the n-period loan rate and the one-period federal funds rate. Equation (35) can be
rewritten
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By using equation (7), Equation (36) can be rewritten
1 1 1 1 1 0
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Equation (37) implies that the loan rate is a weighted average of the previous federal funds
rate, the current federal funds rate and the expected future federal funds rate over n periods
plus the default risk premium plus the previous shadow price of the required reserve
constraint. Since the current shadow price of the CIA constraint at time t is related to the
previous federal funds rate, the previous federal funds rate has an impact on the loan rate and
thus, on the term structure of interest rates. As in the basic model, we assume that the
required reserve constraint is not binding. Since from equation (7), the shadow price of the
CIA constraint is always greater than zero and so the CIA constraint is always binding,
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Combining equation (15) and (38) gives us20
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Comparing equation (16) with equation (39) gives us an implication. The default risk
premium doesn’t change while the maturity of the loan rate (long-term rate) increases. The
reason is that for the n-period loan, the cost resulting from default risk on loans is incurred in
every period.
       Since the loan rate and the federal funds rate are determined on the loan market and the
federal funds market, respectively, we need to incorporate the general equilibrium into our
model. We assume that the public demand function for new n-period loans is similar to that
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 where  ~ /W is new total demand for n-period loans.
The equilibrium condition for new loans is
~ // WW =                                                                                                                                ( 41 )
The new total supply of loans is the sum of the individual bank’s supply of loans at time t.
Since the CIA constraint is always binding, equation (15) becomes the new total loan supply
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Equation (42) means that the n-period loan rate is a function of the shock to demand for loans
and the level of reserve balances. Combining equations (15), (39) with (42) results in
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Equation (43) is the nth-order stochastic difference equation with respect to the federal funds
rate. We conjecture the following solution function for the federal funds rate21
UD 5 T W
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Equation (45) shows that the federal funds rate depends on the shock to loan demand, the
level of reserve balances and unobserved shock to the default risk of loan supply. From
equations (42) and (45), we can examine the effect of the exogenous shock to the loan rate
and the federal funds rate, and thus, to the term structure of interest rates. Suppose there
occurs a positive loan demand shock. We can examine the effect by taking the differential of
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We get similar results as the basic model, i.e., the positive loan demand shock raises the loan
rate and the federal funds rate. The difference is that as the maturity of the loan rate
increases, the response of the loan rate to the positive loan demand shock decreases because
~ EE >  as will be shown in the following result.
       In addition, we can examine the monetary shock to the n-period loan rate and the federal
funds rate. Taking the differential of the n-period loan rate and the federal funds rate with
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The results are similar to the basic model. That is, the expansionary (contractionary)
monetary shock causes the loan rate and the federal funds rate to decrease (increase). The
response of the federal funds rate to the monetary shock might be less or bigger than that of
the n-period loan rate to the monetary shock. It depends on the parameter, d1, which reflects
the cost incurred from the default risk of loans. If this parameter is big enough, the response22
of the federal funds rate to the monetary shock is bigger than that of the loan rate to the
monetary shock. The reason is the same as explained in the basic model.
       Cook and Hahn (1989) find empirically that the effect of a monetary policy shock on the
short-term rate is bigger than on the long-term rate and as the maturity of the long-term rate
increases, the monetary policy shock effect to the long-term rate decreases. Is our result
consistent with their finding? From equation (27) and (47), the response of the loan rates and
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Since the federal funds rate is a one-period rate, the responses of the federal funds rate should
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Solving equation (49) with respect to ~ E  results in
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Equation (50) implies that
~ EE >                                                                                                                                   ( 51 )
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Equation (51) has two main implications. First of all, monetary shocks have less impact on





> 0, the response of the n-
period loan rate to monetary shocks decreases as the maturity of the loan rate increases. The
reason in our model is that as the maturity of the loan rate increases, the effect of the shadow23
price of the CIA constraint on the loan rate decreases by spreading the liquidity effect (the
shadow price of CIA constraint) over many periods
3. That is, the change in the shadow price
of the CIA constraint spreads over many period (n-period). So our result is consistent with
the empirical study.
       Another implication is that as the maturity of the loan rate increases, the demand for
loans is more sensitive to the loan rate. This is consistent with the general theory of demand
for goods. In general, long-term demand for goods is more sensitive to the price of goods
than the short-term demand for goods. Similarly, long-term borrowing is more sensitive to the
price of borrowing funds than short-term borrowing in financial instruments. The reason is
that borrowers have more possibility to borrow various funds for long-term borrowing than
for short-term borrowing. This is the same for the borrowers of bank loans.
       In sum, banks’ liquidity plays an important role in  explaining  the  time-varying  term
premium and thus provides implications for the explanation of the rejection of expectations
hypothesis. The term structure model into which we incorporate bank’s liquidity explains the
empirical phenomena that the monetary shock to the short-term rate is bigger than to the
long-term rate. This model also shows that the response of long-term rates to the monetary
shock decreases as the maturity of the long-term rate increases. Furthermore, these results
confirm the finding of Hamilton (1996, 1997a, 1997b) that the liquidity effect is real, i.e., a
monetary contraction raises short-term interest rate.
,,,(VWLPDWLRQRIWKH7HUP6WUXFWXUH0RGHO
,,, The Data
       The weekly data set we use runs from February, 1, 1984 to August, 27, 1997, which
gives us 709 observations
4. The interest rates and reserves figures are taken from the
                                                          
3 In our model, a representative bank considers the liquidity effect once when it determines its funds’
allocation between loans and Federal funds.
4 Since lagged reserve accounting procedure changed to contemporaneous reserve accounting
procedure from February 1984, we use only data after February 1984.24
Statistical Release provided by the Federal Reserve Board of Governors. We also get
quantities of loans from item 21 of the )HGHUDO5HVHUYH%XOOHWLQ. Since this series refers to
outstanding loans, we use the change of this series as a proxy for the volume of new loans
extended. Federal funds rates (FFR) are averages of 7 calendar days ending on Wednesday
and annualized using a 360-day year or bank interest. One-month commercial paper (CP)
rates are also averages of 7 calendar days ending on Wednesday and annualized using a 360-
day year or bank interest on a discount basis.
5 The Commercial paper rate is viewed as a
substitute for the rate on banks’ loans to financial and industrial companies. Our data on
reserves represent aggregate reserves of depository institutions.
       Figure 1 shows movements of the federal funds rate and one-month commercial paper
rate during this sample. One interesting feature is that the federal funds rate fluctuated around
the one-month commercial paper rate before the 1990 U.S. recession but after the recession
the one-month commercial paper rate was higher than the federal funds rate. During the
sample periods the mean of the federal funds rate and that of the one-month commercial
paper rate are 6.41%, 6.46% respectively and thus the one-month commercial paper rate is on
average higher by 5 basis points than the federal funds rate. However, the standard deviation
of the federal funds rate is 2.11% and hence higher than that of the one-month commercial
paper rate at 2%, which implies that the volatility of the federal funds rate is higher than that
of the commercial paper rate.
,,, The test for simple expectations hypothesis
       We start from the test of the simple expectations hypothesis which implies that the long-
term rate is the weighted average of the current short-term rate and the expected future short-
term rates and that the current spread between the long-term rate and the short-term rate
                                                          
5 The original commercial paper rates are business-daily averages of offer rates on commercial paper
placed by several leading dealers for firms whose bond rating is AA or the equivalent. We construct the
7-days series per week by using the value of the previous business day for the holidays and we take
weekly averages of 7-days series.25
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The simple expectations hypothesis implies that there is no default risk premium or liquidity
premium and so d d h 01 0 ==== TWW. The regression to test the simple expectations
hypothesis is as follows;





























, ,  are the n-period commercial paper rate (substitute for n-period loan rate) and
the one-period federal funds rate respectively; here n corresponds to 4 or 12 weeks for one-
and three-month commercial paper, respectively. Model I can be estimated by OLS with
autocorrelation-heteroskedasticity consistent errors. According to the simple expectations
hypothesis, a f == 01 , . Table 2 shows the  result for estimation of Model I (equation (53)).
       The estimated coefficient on the spread is significantly less than unity and different from
zero at conventional significance levels. In addition, the estimated constant is significantly
less than zero. These results are very similar to previous empirical studies
6.
,,, The test for the expectations hypothesis with default risk premium and liquidity
premium
       Our  model  developed  in  Section  II  implies  that  the  simple  expectations  hypothesis
doesn’t hold because of the liquidity premium and the default risk premium. Since banks’
optimal behavior is subject to a CIA constraint, bank’s liquidity causes the shadow price of
the CIA constraint to play an important role in the term structure of interest rates. Thus, our
                                                          
6 Rudebusch (1995) provides an excellent survey of previous empirical results.26
model suggests that we need to incorporate a liquidity premium and a default risk premium
into the simple expectations hypothesis.
       How  can  we  get  a  series  for  the  shadow  price  of  the  CIA  constraint  reflecting  the
liquidity premium? Recall from Equation (7) that in equilibrium, the current federal funds
rate is the expected value of next period’s discounted shadow price of the CIA constraint by
assuming the required reserve constraint not to be binding. Thus, we can take conditional
expectations of both sides of equation (52) based on information available at t-1 as in (35) to
use the previous federal funds rate for the expected value of the discounted shadow price of
the CIA constraint. In Model II we assume that there is no unobserved shock to default risk.
By using equations, (15) and (39) and setting b = 1, the regression for the expectations
hypothesis with a liquidity premium and an observable default risk premium is as follows:














L W Y 5 U U U U U
Q














g g f a                                                ( 54 )




) . Rational expectations requires YW  to be uncorrelated with anything known to banks
at time t-1 but UW
)  is not in the date t-1 information set. Equation (54) can be estimated by




-- 11 ,,  and 5W-1 as instruments. According to the
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       Table 3 reports the instrumental variable estimation of Model II. The model is totally
unsuccessful. None of the coefficients are statistically significant or close to the predicted
magnitudes.
,,, The test for expectations hypothesis with an unobserved default risk premium and
liquidity premium : Unobserved shock to default risk, TW  and various instruments27
       In Model II, it was assumed that the expected unobserved shock to default risk at time t-1
was zero and we considered only limited instruments. In Model III we allow an unobserved
shock to default risk. If  (T WW - ¹ 1 0, then it is not enough for the instruments to be known at
time t-1; They must also be uncorrelated with  (T WW -1 . If for example the lagged loan rate UW
/
-1
is correlated with the probability of default risk (T WW -1 , then  UW
/
-1 is not a valid instrument
and the results for Model II are based upon misspecification. If the Fed adjusts the supply of
reserves  5W-1 to attempt to insulate UW
)
-1 from fluctuations in the default risk premium, then
5W-1 would also not be a valid instrument.
       We re-estimated equation (54) using as instruments the federal funds rates and lagged
changes in outstanding loans and replacing 5W-1 with  W / . We employ Hansen’s (1982)
method in order to check the overidentifying restrictions and thus, test these conjectures
about what is the correct set of instruments. Hansen’s test statistic has an asymptotic  c
2
distribution with (r-k) degrees of freedom if the model is correctly specified, where r is the
number of instruments and k is the number of estimated coefficients. The regression to test
the expectations hypothesis with liquidity premium and default risk premium is as follows;
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where  /W is the quantity of the new loans at time t
7.
Equation (55) can be estimated by two-stage least squares with a constant, lagged federal
funds rates, and the lagged changes in outstanding loans as instruments. According to Model




21 1 ,, , Q . Table 4 shows the results.
                                                          
7 The original data measure outstanding loans. Our measure of the new loan extended,  W / , is the change
in outstanding loans.28
       The  estimated  coefficient  on  the  spread  is  significantly  different  from  zero  and  not
significantly different from unity in contrast with the estimated coefficient on the spread in
Model I. The t-test for the estimated coefficient of spread shows that the null hypothesis that
the coefficient of spread is unity can not be rejected at the 5% level. These results imply that
the expectations hypothesis might be salvaged under the maintained hypothesis concerning
the liquidity premium and the default risk premium. In addition, the null hypothesis that
Model III is correctly specified can not be rejected at the 5% level. In other words, Model III
with these instruments is not overidentified. Table 5 reports Hansen’s test statistic for various
instruments. When we include the lagged commercial paper rates or the lagged reserve
balances as instruments, the null hypothesis that the model with these instruments is correctly
specified is rejected in most cases. These results imply that these instruments are invalid.
       All the estimated coefficients (except the coefficient on the previous federal funds rate
reflecting the liquidity premium) have the sign predicted by the theoretical model developed
in Section II and all estimated coefficients are statistically significant at conventional level.
The sign of estimated coefficient on the previous federal funds rate is opposite to the
prediction of the theoretical model
8. The value of the estimated coefficient on new loans
extended is relatively high. This result suggests that a reserve supply shock has a significant
impact on the loan rate and thus the term structure of interest rates.
       As  explained  in  the  model  of  Section  II,  the  relatively  high  value  of  the  estimated
coefficient on previous reserve balances implies that the response of the federal funds rate
(short-term rate) to a monetary shock is bigger than the response of the loan rate (long-term
rate) to a monetary shock. These results are consistent with previous studies. Consequently,
monetary policy has an impact on the liquidity premium and the default risk premium as well
as the interest rates of different terms.
                                                          
8 This wrong sign might come from strong autocorrelation of the Federal funds rate and so we checked
the sample autocorrelation of the Federal funds rate. r r r r r r 12351 01 5 ,,,, ,  are 0.991, 0.986, 0.981,29
,9&RQFOXVLRQ
       Even though this paper focuses only on commercial banks among various investors in the
financial markets and employs a simplified model for thinking about liquidity demand by
commercial banks, the results of this paper have important implications. Just like most
households’ transaction activities are subject to their liquidity conditions, banks’ transaction
activities are too. When banks allocate their funds into financial securities of different
maturities, it is necessary for banks to incorporate liquidity consideration. Therefore,
liquidity plays an important role in determining yield spreads. This might be a reason why
previous studies did not produce a consensus about the empirical failure of the expectations
hypothesis. When we incorporate the liquidity premium and the default risk premium
resulting from transaction activities into the term structure of interest rates, the expectations
hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates might be salvaged.
       These results imply that investors think that long-term assets are relatively less liquid
than short-term assets, and the difference in liquidity among financial assets of different
terms needs to be priced into the returns of these assets. Thus, the compensation for holding
illiquid assets is reflected in the return of illiquid assets as a liquidity premium.
       In addition, the paper provides an explanation for the empirical finding that the effect of
a monetary policy shock on the short-term rates is bigger than on the long-term rates. This
empirical finding can be explained by the model presented here. In addition, a monetary
policy has an impact on the term structure of interest rates through not only interest rates, but
also the liquidity premium and the default risk premium on securities of different maturities.
These results also confirm that the liquidity effect is real, i.e., a monetary contraction raises
the short-term rates.
       This paper has several limitations. The model developed in this paper doesn’t consider
highly liquid government securities such as Treasury bills. A more general models would
encompass various investors and Treasury securities in the financial market. Moreover,
                                                                                                                                                                     
0.973, 0.942, 0.905 respectively where n of rQ is the order of autocorrelation. However, since we have30
empirical studies do not use various interest rates for different terms. The extension to
various interest rates such as Treasury bills and Treasury bonds will be important future work
for generalizing the findings of this paper.
                                                                                                                                                                     
to motivate using the change in Federal funds rate from our model, we still need to find a clear reason.31
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Table 2. The Expectation Hypothesis Test without liquidity premium and default risk
premium
maturity of                    $ a                 f ˆ             5
2
long-term rate
4-weeks                    -0.022           0.304         0.171       Weekly Federal funds rate and
                                 (0.010)        (0.098)                         one-month CP rate
12-weeks                 -0.060            0.474         0.200      Weekly Federal funds rate and
                                (0.039)         (0.090)                        three-month CP rate
Note: a. The numbers in parenthesis are Hansen(1982)’s autocorrelation-heteroskedasticity
consistent standard error.
b. 4-weeks are one-month CP rate (n=4) and 12-weeks are three-month CP rate (n=12).
Table 3. The Expectations hypothesis test with liquidity premium and default risk premium
              : Instrumental variable estimation
maturity of             $ a            f ˆ          g 1          g 2                Instrument
long-term rate




W -- - 11 1 ,,
(NBR)                (0.091)   (0.100) (0.0067)  (1.51e-06)




W -- - 11 1 ,,
(TR)                   (0.092)   (0.099)  (0.0072)  (1.45e-06)
Note: a. The numbers in parenthesis are Hansen(1982)’s autocorrelation-heteroskedasticity
consistent standard error.
b. NBR is non-borrowed reserves of depository institution and TR is total reserves of
depository institution.35
Table 4. The expectation hypothesis test with default risk and liquidity premium
              : Two-stage least square with instruments, constant, lagged Federal funds rate and
                 lagged changes in outstanding loans.
maturity of             $ a            f ˆ         g 1           g 2             Instrument
long-term rate
a. Estimation
4-weeks               -0.289    0.879     0.038    -0.00379      constant, UL / WL
)
W - = , ,..., & 11 4 D
(Loan)                 (0.056)  (0.119)  (0.009)  (0.00183)
b. Testing the overidentifying restriction and the correctness of model specification
c12
2 =9.87 and the critical value at 5% level  c12 0 05
2
,. =21.03.  +0is accepted at 5% level.
c. Testing the coefficient of spread
++ 01 11 :, : f f =¹
W7N - = -1.017 and at 5% level W7N - ,. 00 5 = 1.96.  +0is accepted at 5% level.
Note: a. The numbers in parenthesis are Hansen(1982)’s autocorrelation-heteroskedasticity
consistent standard error.
b.  cQ
2  is the statistic of variable which has chi-square distribution with n degree of freedom
and W7N -  is the statistic of variable which has t-distribution with T-k degree of freedom.36
Table 5 The Hansen’s test statistic for various instruments
Instruments                                                  Statistic:
2










L W U U DQG / L U 2 1, , 14 ,..., 2 , 1 , - - - D =              31.21 (23.69)                             Rejected




L W      32.02 (25.00)                             Rejected




L W      32.00 (26.30)                             Rejected




L W      32.18 (27.59)                             Rejected




L W      33.48 (28.87)                             Rejected




L W      33.47 (30.14)                             Rejected




L W  37.18 (38.89)                             Accepted
1 , 14 ,..., 2 , 1 , - - D = W W
)
L W 5 DQG / L U                    31.83 (22.36)                             Rejected
2 , 1 , , 14 ,..., 2 , 1 , = D = - - L 5 DQG / L U L W W
)
L W        32.40 (23.69)                             Rejected
3 , 2 , 1 , , 14 ,..., 2 , 1 , = D = - - L 5 DQG / L U L W W
)
L W     34.45 (25.00)                             Rejected
4 ,.., 1 , , 14 ,..., 2 , 1 , = D = - - L 5 DQG / L U L W W
)
L W     39.19 (26.30)                             Rejected
5 ,.., 1 , , 14 ,..., 2 , 1 , = D = - - L 5 DQG / L U L W W
)
L W     41.23 (27.59)                             Rejected
14 ,.., 1 , , 14 ,..., 2 , 1 , = D = - - L 5 DQG / L U L W W
)
L W    48.48 (38.89)                             Rejected
1 , 14 ,..., 2 , 1 , - - = W
)
L W 5 DQG L U                             30.94 (21.03)                             Rejected
2 , 1 , , 14 ,..., 2 , 1 , = = - - L 5 DQG L U L W
)
L W                31.37 (22.36)                             Rejected
3 , 2 , 1 , , 14 ,..., 2 , 1 , = = - - L 5 DQG L U L W
)
L W             32.39 (23.69)                             Rejected
4 ,.., 1 , , 14 ,..., 2 , 1 , = = - - L 5 DQG L U L W
)
L W             36.65 (25.00)                             Rejected
5 ,.., 1 , , 14 ,..., 2 , 1 , = = - - L 5 DQG L U L W
)
L W             39.76 (26.30)                             Rejected
14 ,.., 1 , , 14 ,..., 2 , 1 , = = - - L 5 DQG L U L W
)
L W           46.04 (37.65)                             Rejected
Note: The values in parentheses are the critical values with the degree of freedom, r-k, where r is the
number of instruments and k is the number of estimated coefficients.37
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